This work studies the convergence properties of continuous-time fictitious play in potential games. It is shown that in almost every potential game and for almost every initial condition, fictitious play converges to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Introduction.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a solution concept for multi-player games in which no player can unilaterally improve their personal utility. Formally, a Nash equilibrium is defined as a fixed point of the best response mapping-that is, a strategy x * is said to be a NE if
where BR denotes the best response mapping (see Section 2 for a formal definition).
A question of fundamental interest is, given the opportunity to interact, how might a group of players adaptively learn to play a NE strategy over time? In response, it is natural to consider the the dynamical system induced by the best response mapping itself:
(1)ẋ ∈ BR(x) − x.
By definition, the set of NE coincide with the equilibrium points of these dynamics. Historically, these dynamics are known as fictitious play (FP). 1 After a time change and a discretization, the dynamics (1) yield the familiar (discrete-time) FP process first introduced by Brown in [5] (see, e.g., [4, 11, 17] ).
FP is known to converge to the set of NE in several important classes of games [4, 11, 23, 25, 26] , though not all games [14, 27] . Of particular interest to this work are results showing that FP converges to the set of NE in a class of games known as potential games [3, 24, 25] .
In a potential game, there exists an underlying potential function which all players implicitly seek to maximize. Such games are fundamentally cooperative in nature (all players benefit by maximizing the potential), and have many important applications in engineering and economics [19, 24] . Along with so called harmonic games (which are fundamentally adversarial in nature), potential games may be seen as one of the basic building blocks of general N -player games [6] .
The set of NE may be subdivided into pure-strategy (deterministic) NE and mixed-strategy (probabilistic) NE. Mixed-strategy NE can be problematic for a number of reasons [14] . In engineering applications involving potential games, mixedstrategy NE can be undesirable since they are nondeterministic, have suboptimal expected utility, and do not always have clear physical meaning [2] . Consequently, in applications, preference is generally given to algorithms that are guaranteed to converge to a pure-strategy NE [2, 18, 20, 21] .
For FP learning dynamics, mixed-strategy NE are problematic at an even more fundamental level (both in and out of potential games), since they can cause nonuniqueness of solutions and make it impossible to establish general convergence rate estimates [11] .
It has been speculated that, for FP learning dynamics, the difficulties arising due to mixed equilibria rarely occur in practice. For example, in [2] it is noted that "it is generally believed that convergence of [FP] to a mixed (but not pure) Nash equilibrium happens rarely when [players'] utilities are not equivalent to a zero-sum game". 2 Despite such speculation, there are currently no rigorous results showing that FP behaves in this manner (e.g., only reaching mixed equilibria from a null set of initial conditions) in any particular class of games.
An important benefit of potential games is that they guarantee the existence of pure-strategy NE. Nevertheless, it is well known that FP can converge to a mixedstrategy equilibrium in such games. In fact, this deficiency was first noted in the paper where it was originally proven that FP converges to NE in potential games (see [25] , Remark (2)).
In this paper, we refine the convergence result for FP in potential games in an attempt to redeem it somewhat in this regard and address the issues noted above. The following theorem is our main result. Theorem 1. In almost all potential games, and for almost all initial conditions, FP converges to a pure-strategy NE.
In particular, we show that in any regular potential game, FP converges to a purestrategy NE from almost every initial condition. The notion of a regular game was introduced by Harsanyi [12] . In a companion paper [28] , we show that almost all potential games are regular.
Three important byproducts of the proof of Theorem 1 are (i) in a regular potential game, FP can only reach the set of mixed equilibria in finite time from a null set of initial conditions (see Proposition 15) , (ii) in a regular potential game, if FP converges to the set of mixed-strategy equilibria, then it does so in finite time (see Proposition 22) , and (iii) except for a null set of initial conditions, solutions of FP are unique in any regular potential game (see Lemma 17 and Remark 21). 3 1.1. Related Work. A related result for two-player games has been shown in [15] , where it was demonstrated that FP almost never converges cyclically to a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which both players use more than two pure-strategies. In this paper we focus on N -player potential games and we show that, in such games, convergence to mixed equilibria is generically impossible.
Continuous-time best-response dynamics similar to those we consider here have been studied in various works, including [4, 11, 13, 22] . These papers study a variety of convergence properties for FP and replicator dynamics in a wide class of games, but do not consider the question of generic convergence to pure-strategy equilibria.
As noted earlier, the problem of characterizing the rate of convergence in FP, as studied in [11] , is closely related to our work here. The mere existence of mixedstrategy equilibria presents a fundamental barrier to establishing precise convergence rate estimates in FP. This issue is partially resolved by the present work since we show that mixed-strategy NE can only be reached in finite time from a null set of initial conditions (see Proposition 15.) We intend to further address the issue of characterizing the rate of convergence of FP in potential games in a future work.
1.2. Proof Strategy. The basic strategy is to leverage two noteworthy properties satisfied in almost every potential game:
1. The FP vector field cannot concentrate mass in finite time, meaning it cannot map a set of positive (Lebesgue) measure to a set of zero measure in finite time (see Section 5.1).
2.
In a neighborhood of an interior Nash equilibrium (i.e., a completely mixed equilibrium), the magnitude of the time derivative of the potential along paths grows linearly in the distance to the Nash equilibrium, while the value of the potential varies only quadratically; that is,
where U denotes the potential function and x * is the equilibrium point.
Using Markov's inequality, property 2 immediately implies that if a path converges to an interior NE then it must do so in finite time (see Section 5.2). Hence, properties 1 and 2 together imply that the set of points from which FP converges to an interior NE must have Lebesgue measure zero.
In order to handle mixed NE that are not in the interior of the strategy space (i.e., incompletely mixed equilibria), we consider a projection that maps incompletely mixed equilibria to the interior of the strategy space of a lower dimensional game. Using the techniques described above we are then able to handle completely and incompletely mixed equilibria in a unified manner.
In particular, we see that the set of points from which FP converges to the set of mixed-strategy NE has Lebesgue measure zero. Since any FP path must converge to a NE [4] , this implies Theorem 1.
Properties 1 and 2 hold as long the equilibrium x * is regular. In a companion paper we show that, in almost all potential games, all equilibria are regular (see Theorem 4 below).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up notation. Section 3 discusses regular potential games. Section 4 establishes the two key inequalities used to prove Theorem 1, and Section 5 gives the proof of Theorem 1.
Comparison with Classical Techniques. Given a classical ODE, one
can prove that an equilibrium point may only be reached from a set of measure zero by studying the linearized dynamics at the equilibrium point. Assuming all eigenvalues associated with the linearized system are non-zero, the dimension of the stable manifold (i.e., the set of initial conditions from which the equilibrium can be reached) is equal to the dimension of the stable eigenspace of the linearized system [8] . Hence, to prove that an equilibrium can only be reached from a set of measure zero, it is sufficient to prove that at least one eigenvalue of the linearized system lies in the right half plane.
In FP, the vector field is discontinuous-hence, it is not possible to linearize around an equilibrium point, and such classical techniques cannot be directly applied. However, the gradient field of the potential function may be seen as an approximation of the FP vector field (see Lemma 8) . Unlike the FP vector field, the gradient field of the potential function can be linearized. In a non-degenerate game, any completely mixed-strategy NE is a non-degenerate saddle point of the potential function. Hence, at least one eigenvalue of the linearized gradient system must lie in the right-half plane. This implies that, for the gradient dynamics of the potential function, the stable manifold associated with an equilibrium point has dimension at most κ − 1, where κ is the dimension of the strategy space.
Since the FP vector field approximates the gradient field of the potential function, intuition suggests that for FP dynamics, each mixed equilibrium should also admit a similar low-dimensional stable manifold.
While this provides an intuitive explanation for why one might expect Theorem 1 to hold, we did not use any such linearization arguments in the proof of this result. We found that studying the rate of potential production near mixed equilibria (e.g., as discussed in the "proof strategy" section above) led to shorter and simpler proofs.
Preliminaries.
2.1. Notation. A game in normal form is represented by the tuple Γ := (N, (Y i , u i ) i=1,...,N ), where N ∈ {2, 3, . . .} denotes the number of players, Y i = {y 1 i , . . . , y Ki i } denotes the set of pure strategies (or actions) available to player i, with cardinality K i := |Y i |, and u i : N j=1 Y j → R denotes the utility function of player i. Denote by Y := N i=1 Y i the set of joint pure strategies, and let K := N i=1 K i denote the number of joint pure strategies.
For a finite set S, let (S) denote the set of probability distributions over S. For i = 1, . . . , N , let ∆ i := (Y i ) denote the set of mixed-strategies available to player i. Let ∆ := N i=1 ∆ i denote the set of joint mixed strategies. 4 Let ∆ −i := j∈{1,...,N }\{i} ∆ j . When convenient, given a mixed strategy σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ N ) ∈ ∆, we use the notation σ −i to denote the tuple (σ j ) j =i Given a mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆, the expected utility of player i is given by
For σ −i ∈ ∆ −i , the best response of player i is given by the set-valued function
and for σ ∈ ∆ the joint best response is given by the set valued function BR :
A strategy σ ∈ ∆ is said to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) if σ ∈ BR i (σ). For convenience, we sometimes refer to a Nash equilibrium simply as an equilibrium.
We say that Γ is a potential game [24] if there exists a function u :
Let U : ∆ → R be the multilinear extension of u defined by
The function U may be seen as giving the expected value of u under the mixed strategy σ. We refer to U as the potential function and to u as the pure form of the potential function.
Using the definitions of U i and U it is straightforward to verify that
Thus, in order to compute the best response set we only require knowledge of the potential function U , not necessarily the individual utility functions (U i ) i=1,...,N . By way of notation, given a pure strategy y i ∈ Y i and a mixed strategy σ −i ∈ ∆ −i , we will write U (y i , σ −i ) to indicate the value of U when player i uses a mixed strategy placing all weight on the y i and the remaining players use the strategy σ −i ∈ ∆ −i .
Given a σ i ∈ ∆ i , let σ k i denote value of the k-th entry in σ i , so that σ i = (σ k i ) Ki k=1 . Since the potential function is linear in each σ i , if we fix any i = 1, . . . , N we may express it as
In order to study learning dynamics without being (directly) encumbered by the hyperplane constraint inherent in ∆ i we define
where we use the convention that x k i denotes the k-th entry in x i so that
. Let X := X 1 × · · · × X N and let T : X → ∆ be the bijection given by T = T 1 × · · · × T N . In an abuse of terminology, we sometimes refer to X as the mixedstrategy space of Γ. When convenient, given an x ∈ X we use the notation x −i to denote the tuple (x j ) j =i . Letting X −i := j =i X j , we define T −i :
denote the dimension of X, and note that κ = K, where K, defined earlier, is the cardinality of the joint pure strategy set Y .
Throughout the paper we often find it convenient to work in X rather than ∆. In order to keep the notation as simple as possible we overload the definitions of some symbols when the meaning can be clearly derived from the context. In particular, let BR i :
Similarly, given an x ∈ X we abuse notation and write U (x) instead of U (T (x)).
Given a pure strategy y i ∈ Y i , we will write U (y i , x −i ) to indicate the value of U when player i uses a mixed strategy placing all weight on the y i and the remaining players use the strategy x −i ∈ X −i . Similarly, we will say y k i ∈ BR i (x −i ) if there exists an x i ∈ BR i (x −i ) such that T i (x i ) places weight one on y k i . Applying the definition of T i to (3) we see that U (x) may also be expressed as
for any i = 1, . . . , N . We use the following nomenclature to refer to strategies in X.
Definition 2. (i) A strategy x ∈ X is said to be pure if T (x) places all its mass on a single action tuple y ∈ Y . (ii) A strategy x ∈ X is said to be completely mixed if x is in the interior of X.
(iii) In all other cases, a strategy x ∈ X is said to be incompletely mixed.
A fictitious play process is defined as follows.
Definition 3. An absolutely-continuous mapping x : R → X is said to be a fictitious play process with initial condition x 0 ∈ X if x(0) = x 0 and (1) holds for almost all t ∈ R.
Other notation as used throughout the paper is as follows.
• N := {1, 2, . . .}. gives the full gradient of U .
• Suppose m, n, p ∈ N, F i : R m × R n → R, for i = 1, . . . , p. Suppose further that F : R m × R n → R p is given by F (w, z) = (F i (w, z)) i=1,...,p . Then the operator D w gives the Jacobian of F with respect to the components of w = (w k ) k=1,...,m ; that is
• A c denotes the complement of a set A, andÅ denotes the interior of A, and cl A denotes the closure of A. • Given an open set Ω ⊂ R n , and k ∈ N ∪ {∞}, C k c (Ω) denotes the set of k-times differentiable functions with compact support in Ω.
Almost All Potential
Games. The set of potential games in which there are N players, each having an action space of size K i , is isomorphic to R Kp , where [28] . We say that a property holds for almost all potential games if the subset of potential games where the property does not hold has L Kp -measure zero.
3. Regular Potential Games. The notion of a regular equilibrium was introduced by Harsanyi [12] . Regular equilibria posses a variety of desirable robustness properties [29] .
Being a rather stringent refinement concept, not all games possess regular equilibria. However, "most" games do. A game is said to be regular if all equilibria in the game are regular. Harsanyi [12] showed that almost all N -player games are regular.
The set of potential games forms a low dimensional (Lebesgue-measure-zero) subspace within the space of all games. Since the set of potential games is itself a measure zero set, Harsanyi's regularity result is inconclusive about the prevalence of regular equilibria within this class of games. In a companion paper [28] , we study this issue and show the following theorem.
Theorem 4 ( [28], Theorem 1). Almost every potential game is regular. In this paper we will study the behavior of FP in regular potential games. The purpose of this restriction is twofold. First, there are degenerate potential games in which FP does not converge for almost all initial conditions. Restricting attention to regular potential games ensures that the game is not degenerate in this sense. Second, analysis of the behavior of FP is easier near equilibria that are regular. Regularity permits us to characterize the fundamental properties of the potential function U without needing to look at anything higher than second order terms in the Taylor series expansion of U . This substantially simplifies the analysis.
If x * is a regular equilibrium of a potential game, then the derivatives of potential function can be shown to satisfy two non-degeneracy conditions at x * . The first condition deals with the gradient of the potential function at x * and is referred to as the first-order condition; the second condition deals with the Hessian of the potential function at x * and is referred to as the second-order condition. These conditions, introduced in Sections 3.1-3.2 below, will be crucial in the subsequent analysis.
3.1. First-Order Degeneracy. Let Γ be a potential game. Following Harsanyi [12] , we will define the carrier set of an element x ∈ X, a natural modification of a support set to the present context. For
Let γ i := |C i | and assume that the strategy set Y i , is reordered so that C i = {y 1 i , . . . , y γi i }. Under this ordering, the first γ i − 1 components of any strategy x i with carr i (x i ) = C i are free (not constrained to zero by C i ) and the remaining components of x i are constrained to zero. That is (x k i ) γi−1 k=1 is free under C i and (x k i ) Ki k=γi = 0. The set of strategies {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C} is precisely the interior of the face of X given by (6) Ω C := {x ∈ X :
Let x * be an equilibrium with carrier C. We say that x * is first-order degenerate if there exists a pair (i, k), i = 1, . . . , N , k = γ i , . . . , K i − 1 such that ∂U (x * ) ∂x k i = 0, and we say x * is first-order non-degenerate otherwise.
Remark 5. We note that using the multi-linearity of U , it is straightforward to verify that an equilibrium is first order non-degenerate if and only if it is quasistrong, as introduced by Harsanyi [12] . In particular, an equilibrium x * is first-order degenerate if and only if carr i (x * i ) BR i (x * −i ) for some i = 1, . . . , N . We prefer to use the term first order non-degenerate since it emphasizes that we are concerned with the gradient of the potential function and it keeps nomenclature consistent with the notion of second-order non-degeneracy, introduced next.
Second-Order
Degeneracy. Let C be some carrier set. LetÑ := |{i = 1, . . . , N : γ i ≥ 2}|, and assume that the player set is ordered so that γ i ≥ 2 for i = 1, . . . ,Ñ . Under this ordering, for strategies with carr(x) = C, the firstÑ players use mixed strategies and the remaining players use pure strategies. Assume that N ≥ 1 so that any x with carrier C is a mixed (not pure) strategy.
Let the Hessian of U taken with respect to C be given by
Note that this definition of the Hessian restricts attention to the components of x that are free under C We say an equilibrium x * ∈ X is second-order degenerate if the HessianH(x * ) taken with respect to carr(x * ) is singular, and we say x * is second-order non-degenerate otherwise.
Remark 6. Note that both forms of degeneracy are concerned with the interaction of the potential function and the "face" of the strategy space containing the equilibrium x * . If x * touches one or more constraints, then first-order non-degeneracy ensures that the gradient of the potential function is nonzero normal to the face Ω carr(x * ) , defined in (6) . Second-order non-degeneracy ensures that, restricting U to the face Ω carr(x * ) , the Hessian of U Ω carr(x * )
is non-singular. If x * is contained within the interior of X, then the first-order condition becomes moot and the second-order condition reduces to the standard definition of a non-degenerate critical point.
Throughout the paper we will study regular potential games. The following lemma from [28] shows that, in any regular potential game, all equilibria are first and second-order non-degenerate. Lemma 12) . Let Γ be a potential game. An equilibrium x * is regular if and only if it is both first and second-order non-degenerate.
Potential Production Inequalities.
In this section we prove two key inequalities ((12) and (13) ) that are the backbone of our proof of Theorem 1.
We note that in proving Theorem 1 there is a fundamental dichotomy between studying completely mixed equilibria and incompletely mixed equilibria. Completely mixed equilibria lie in the interior of the strategy space. At these points the gradient of the potential function is zero and the Hessian is non-singular; local analysis of the dynamics is relatively easy. On the other hand, incompletely mixed equilibria necessarily lie on the boundary of X and the potential function may have a nonzero gradient at these points. 5 Analysis of the dynamics around these points is fundamentally more delicate.
In order to handle incompletely mixed equilibria we construct a nonlinear projection whose range is a lower dimensional game in which the image of the equilibrium under consideration is completely mixed. This allows us to handle both types of mixed equilibria in a unified manner.
4.1. Projection to a Lower-Dimensional Game. Let x * be a mixed equilibrium. 6 
. . , N } : γ i ≥ 2 , and assume that the player set is ordered so that γ i ≥ 2 for i = 1, . . . ,Ñ . Since x * is assumed to be a mixed-strategy equilibrium, we haveÑ ≥ 1.
Given an x ∈ X, we will frequently use the decomposition
..,Ñ , k=1,...,γi−1 and x p contains the remaining components of x. 7 Let
. Recalling that κ is the dimension of X (see (4)), note that for
The set of joint pure strategies Y may be expressed as an ordered set Y =
For each pure strategy y τ ∈ Y , τ = 1, . . . , K, let u τ denote the pure-strategy potential associated with playing y τ ; that is, u τ := u(y τ ), where u is the pure form of the potential function defined in Section 2. A vector of potential coefficients u
Given a vector of potential coefficients u ∈ R K and a strategy x ∈ X, let 8
Differentiating (5) we see that at the equilibrium x * we have ∂U (x * ) ∂x k i = 0 for i = 1, . . . ,Ñ , k = 1, . . . , γ i − 1 (see Lemma 26 in appendix), or equivalently,
By Definition 2, the (mixed) equilibrium x * is completely mixed if γ = κ, and is incompletely mixed otherwise. Suppose γ < κ so that x * is incompletely mixed. Let J(x) := D xm F (x p , x m , u) and note that by definition we have J(x * ) =H(x * ).
Since Γ is assumed to be a non-degenerate game, J(x * ) is invertible. By the implicit function theorem, there exists a function g :
The graph of g is given by
Note that Graph(g) is a smooth manifold with Hausdorff dimension (κ − γ) [9] . An intuitive interpretation of Graph(g) is given in Remark 11. If Γ is a non-degenerate potential game then, using the multilinarity of U , we see that γ ≥ 2 (see Lemma 23 in appendix). This implies that (9) Graph(g) has Hausdorff dimension at most (κ − 2).
Let Ω := Ω C , where Ω C is defined in (6), denote the face of X containing x * . Define the mappingP :
. . ,Ñ , and letX :=X 1 × · · · ×XÑ . Let P : D(P) →X with domain D(P) = D(P) ⊂ X be given by (11) P := (P k i ) i=1,...,Ñ , k=1,...,γi−1 .
Note that P contains the components ofP not constrained to zero. As we will see in the following section, P may be interpreted as a projection into a lower dimensional game in which P(x * ) is a completely mixed equilibrium.
Inequalities.
LetŨ :X → R be given bỹ
is the mixed equilibrium fixed in the beginning of the section. LetΓ be a potential game with player set {1, . . . ,Ñ }, mixed-strategy spaceX i , i = 1, . . . ,Ñ , and potential functionŨ . By construction, P(x * ) is a completely mixed equilibrium ofΓ. Moreover, by the definition of a non-degenerate equilibrium, the Hessian ofŨ is invertible at P(x * ).
We are interested in studying the projection P(x(t)) of a FP process into the lower dimensional gameΓ. 9 We wish to show that the following two inequalities hold:
for some constant c 2 > 0. The first inequality follows from Taylor's theorem and the fact that ∇Ũ (P(x * )) = 0. The following section is devoted to proving (13). 10 4.3. Proving the Differential Inequality. We begin with Lemma 8 which shows-roughly speaking-that within the interior of the action space, the FP vector field approximates the gradient field of the potential function.
The following definitions are useful in the lemma.
denote the distance between the set P Xi (B) and the boundary of X i . Since we will eventually be interested in studying a lower-dimensional game derived from Γ, in the lemma we consider an alternative gameΓ of arbitrary size.
Lemma 8. LetΓ be a potential game with player set {1, . . . ,N }, action setsŶ i , i = 1, . . . ,N , with cardinalityK i := |Ŷ i |, and potential functionÛ . LetX =X 1 × · · · ×XN denote the mixed strategy space.
Let B ⊂X and fix i ∈ {1, . . . ,N }. Then for all x ∈ B there holds
where the constant c is given by c = d(P Xi (B), ∂X i ).
Proof. Let x ∈ B. If ∇ xiÛ (x) 1 = 0, then ∇ xiÛ (x) = 0, and the inequality is trivially satisfied. Suppose from now on that ∇ xiÛ (x) 1 > 0.
Without loss of generality, assume that Y i is ordered so that
Differentiating (5) we find that 11
Together with (15) , this implies that for k = 1, . . . ,K i − 1 we have
Using the multlinearity ofÛ we see that if ξ i ∈ BR i (x −i ) and ξ k i > 0 then y k+1
which is the desired result.
Remark 9. Since the space X i in Lemma 8 is finite dimensional, given any norm · , there exists a constantc > 0 such that
For each x = (x p , x m ) ∈ X near to x * , the following lemma allows us to define an additional lower dimensional game Γ xp associated with x p in which the best response set is closely related to the best response set for the original game Γ. The lemma is a straightforward consequence of the definition of the best response correspondence and the continuity of ∇U .
Lemma 10. For x in a neighborhood of x * , the best response set satisfies
Given any x = (x p , x m ) ∈ X we defineŨ xp :X → R and ∼ BR xp,i :X −i ⇒X i as follows. Forx ∈X let Let Γ xp be the potential game with player set {1, . . . ,Ñ }, mixed strategy spacẽ X and potential functionŨ xp . Note that since U is continuous andX is compact, U xp converges uniformly toŨ x * p =:Ũ as x p → x * p . In this sense the game Γ xp can be seen as converging toΓ as x p → x * p . Remark 11. The function g defined in Section 4.1 admits the following interpretation. Suppose we fix some x p = (x k i ) i=1,...,N, k=γi,...,Ki−1 . Then g(x p ) is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of Γ xp . Moreover, if we let x p → x * p , then the corresponding equilibrium of the reduced game Γ xp converges to x * , i.e., (x p , g(x p )) → (x * p , g(x * p )) = x * , precisely along Graph(g). Remark 12. Suppose x * is a first-order non-degenerate equilibrium. Using the multilinearity of U we see that for any x ∈ X we have carr i (x i ) ⊆ BR i (x −i ). By Remark 5, at x * we have carr i (x * i ) = BR i (x * −i ). Due to the ordering we assumed on
By Lemma 10, this implies that for all x in a neighborhood of x * and forx
The following lemma extends the result of Lemma 8 so it applies in a useful way to the potential functionŨ under the projection P.
Lemma 13. There exists a constant c > 0 such that for all x = (x p , x m ) in a neighborhood of x * and all η ∈ R γi−1 with η sufficiently small we have Proof. By construction, the projection P(x * ) maps x * into the interior ofX. Choose > 0 such that the ball B(P(x * ), ) ⊂X is separated by a positive distance from the boundary ofX. Applying Lemma 8 (and Remark 9) to the game Γ xp we see that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for any x = (x p , x m ) ∈ X with x m ∈ B(P(x * ), ) there holds
Note that the constant in Lemma 8 is only dependent on the distance from the set B (in this case, B(P(x * ), )) to the boundary of the strategy space (in this case,X), and is independent of the particular potential function under consideration-this permits the choice of c > 0 in (22) that holds uniformly for all x p .
By the continuity of U and P we have
and P(x) ∈ B(x * , ), for all x in a sufficiently small neighborhood of x * and x ∈ Graph(g). Note that diamX i := max xi,x i ∈Xi x i − x i = √ 2, and hence, z i ≤ √ 2
Thus, (22) and (23) give
and all x in a neighborhood of x * , x ∈ Graph(g). As long as η ≤ c, the desired result holds for x in a neighborhood of x * , x ∈ Graph(g). But x ∈ Graph(g) =⇒ P(x) = P(x * ) =⇒ ∇ xiŨ (P(x)) = 0, in which case the inequality is trivially satisfied.
Finally, the following lemma shows that the differential inequality (13) holds.
Lemma 14. Let Γ be a non-degenerate potential game with mixed equilibrium x * , and let (x(t)) t≥0 be a FP process. Then the inequality (13) holds for x(t) in a neighborhood of x * . Using the chain rule we may express the time derivative of the potential along the pathP(x(t)) as d dt U (P(x(t))) = ∇U (P(x(t))) I P(x) 0 0 ẋ = ∇ xm U (P(x(t)))(I P(x))ẋ.
Proof. Let
, and let η(t) = (η i (t))Ñ i=1 . Multiplying out the right two terms above we get (24) d dt U (P(x(t))) = ∇ xm U (P(x(t))) (ẋ m + η(t))
By Lemma 10 and Remark 12, if we restrict x(t) to a sufficiently small neighborhood of x * then for any
] −i ) and z i = 0. We note two important consequences of this: (i) If we restrict x(t) to a sufficiently small neighborhood of x * and note that U (P(x(t))) =Ũ (P(x(t)), then by (24) we have
We may force max i=1,...,Ñ η i to be arbitrarily small by restricting x(t) to a neighborhood of x * .
Consequence (i) follows readily by using the definition of FP (1). To show consequence (ii), note that by (1) we haveẋ k i = z k i − x k i for all i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , K i , for some z i ∈ BR i (x −i ). But, for x in a neighborhood of x * and k ≥ γ i , we have shown above that z k i = 0, and henceẋ k i = −x k i . 12 Due the ordering we assumed for Y i , we have [x * ] k i = 0 for any (i, k) such that k ≥ γ i . Hence, x k i → 0 as x → x * , for any (i, k) such that k ≥ γ i .
Furthermore, there exists a c > 0 such that |
. . , N , ≥ γ j uniformly for x in a neighborhood of x * (see Lemma 27 in appendix). By the definition of η i , this implies that max i=1,...,Ñ η i may be made arbitrarily small by restricting x(t) to a sufficiently small neighborhood of x * . Now, let x(t) be restricted to a sufficiently small neighborhood of x * so that η i (t) is small enough to apply Lemma 13 for each i. Applying Lemma 13 to (25) we get d dtŨ (P(x(t))) ≥ Ñ i=1 c ∇ xiŨ (P(x(t))) for x(t) in a neighborhood of x * . By the equivalence of finite-dimensional norms, there exists a constant c 1 such that d dtŨ (P(x(t))) ≥ c 1 ∇Ũ (P(x(t))) for x(t) in a neighborhood of x * .
Since Γ is assumed to be (second-order) non-degenerate, P(x * ) is a non-degenerate critical point ofŨ . By Lemma 28 (see appendix) there exists a constant c 2 such that c 1 ∇Ũ (x) ≥ c 2 d(x, P(x * )) for allx ∈X in a neighborhood of P(x * ). Since P is continuous we have d dtŨ (P(x(t))) ≥ c 2 d(P(x(t)), P(x * )), for x(t) in a neighborhood of x * .
Proof of Main
Result. We will assume throughout this section that Γ is a regular potential game. By Theorem 4, the ensuing results hold for almost all potential games.
For each mixed equilibrium x * , let the set Λ(x * ) ⊂ X be defined as
where g is defined with respect to x * as in Section 4.1.
In this section we will prove Theorem 1 in two steps. First, we will show that for each mixed equilibrium x * , the set Λ(x * ) can only be reached in finite time from an L κ -null set of initial conditions (see Proposition 15) , where κ, defined in (4), is the dimension of X. Second, we will show that if a FP process converges to the set Λ(x * ), then it must do so in finite time (see Proposition 22) . Since x * ∈ Λ(x * ), Propositions 15 and 22 together show that that for any mixed equilibrium x * , the set of initial conditions from which FP converges to x * has L κ -measure zero.
By Theorem 2 of [28] we see that in regular potential games, the set of NE is finite. Hence, Propositions 15 and 22 imply that FP can only converge to set of mixed strategy equilibria from a L κ -null set of initial conditions. Since a FP process must converge to the set of NE in a potential game ( [4], Theorem 5.5), this implies that Theorem 1 holds.
Finite-Time
Convergence. The goal of this subsection is to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 15. Let Γ be a non-degenerate game and let x * be a mixed-strategy NE of Γ. The set Λ(x * ) can only be reached by a FP process in finite time from a set of initial conditions with L κ -measure zero. That is,
Before proving the proposition we present some definitions and preliminary results. Let (26) I N , k, = 1 , . . . , K i , = k, be the set in which player i is indifferent between his k-th and -th actions.
If the game Γ is non-degenerate, then each I i,k, is the union of smooth surfaces with Hausdorff dimension at most (k − 1) (see Lemma 32 in appendix). In particular, for each x ∈ I i,k, there exists a vector ν ∈ R κ that is normal to I i,k, at x. We refer to the set I i,k, as an indifference surface of player i.
We define the setQ ⊆ X as follows. LetQ contain the set of points where two or more indifference surfaces intersect and their normal vectors do not coincide. Furthermore, if an indifference surface I has a componentÎ ⊆ I with Hausdorff dimension less than κ − 1, then we put any points whereÎ intersects with another decision surface intoQ. Since each indifference surface is smooth with dimension at most κ − 1,Q has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2. Let
As shown in Section 4.1, if x * is non-degenerate, then the set Graph(g) (and hence Λ(x * )) has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2. Thus Q has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2. 13 The FP vector field (see (1) ) is given by FP : X ⇒ X, where Let Z := x ∈ X\Q : x ∈ I i,k, for some i, k, with normal ν at x, (28) and ν · z = 0 for some z ∈ FP(x) .
Since each I i,k, has Hausdorff dimension κ − 1, Z has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 1. We define the relative boundary of Z, denoted here as ∂Z as follows. If Z has Hausdorff dimension κ−2 or less, then let ∂Z := Z. If Z has Hausdorff dimension κ − 1 then it may be expressed as the union of a finite number of smooth (κ − 1)dimensional surfaces, denoted here as (Z s ) Nz s=1 , 1 ≤ N z < ∞, and a component with Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2, denoted here as Z . That is, Z = ( ∂Z s ∪ Z . 13 Proposition 15 can easily be generalized to say that any set A ⊂ X such that cl A has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2, can only be reached in finite time from a set of L κ -measure zero by substituting A for Λ(x * ) throughout the section.
Note that ∂Z is a set with Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2. By Lemma 35 in the appendix, the FP vector field is oriented tangentially along Z, in the sense that for any x ∈ Z there holds ν · y = 0 for any vector ν normal to Z at x, and any y ∈ FP(x). This implies that FP paths can only enter or exit Z through ∂Z.
Let
The following technical lemma will be used to show that FP is well posed within X * (see Lemma 17) . It is a consequence of the fact that the FP vector field can only have jumps that are tangential to indifference surfaces.
Lemma 16. Suppose x ∈ X * is in some indifference surface I i,k, . Then there exists a constant c > 0 and a vector ν that is normal to I i,k, at x, such that
for allx ∈ X * in a neighborhood of x.
Proof. By the definition of I i,k, , if x ∈ I i,k, then for allx ∈ X such that x −i = x −i we havex ∈ I i,k, . This implies that for any vector ν that is normal to I i,k, , the (i, m)-th component of ν must be zero for all m = 1, . . . , K i − 1.
Suppose that x ∈ X * ∩ I i,k, . Since x ∈ Q, there is a neighborhood of x in which no indifference surface intersects with I i,k, . This implies that forx within a neighborhood of x, BR −i (x) = a −i for some a −i that is a vertex of X −i .
Together, these two facts imply that for allx in a neighborhood of x, we have ν · z = ν · z for all z ∈ BR(x), z ∈ BR(x), for any vector ν that is normal to I i,k, at x. Since x / ∈ Z, recalling the form of FP (27) , this means we can choose a vector ν that is normal to I i,k, at x and a constant c > 0 such that ν · z > c for z ∈ FP(x) for allx in a neighborhood of x.
The following lemma gives a well-posedness result for FP inside X * .
Lemma 17. For any x 0 ∈ X * , there exists a T ∈ (0, ∞] and a unique absolutelycontinuous function x : [0, T ] → X * , with x(0) = x 0 , solving the differential inclusion d dt x(t) ∈ FP(x(t)) for almost all t.
Proof. If x ∈ X * is not on any indifference surface, then FP is single valued in a neighborhood of x, and (1) is (locally) a Lipschitz differential equation with unique local solution.
Suppose that x 0 ∈ X * is on an indifference surface I. By Lemma 16 there exists a constant c > 0 such that for allx in a neighborhood of x we have FP(x) · ν > c, where ν is a normal vector to I at x. This implies that for δ > 0 sufficiently small we have {t ∈ [−δ, δ] : x(t) ∈ I} = {0}. Furthermore, since x ∈ Q, for δ > 0 sufficiently small we have (29) {t ∈ [−δ, δ] :
Now, let x 0 ∈ X * and let (x(t)) t≥0 and (z(t)) t≥0 be two solutions to (1) with x(0) = z(0) = x 0 . If (x(t)) t≥0 never crosses an indifference surface, then the flow is always classical and the two solutions always coincide; i.e., x(t) = z(t), t ≥ 0. Suppose that (x(t)) t≥0 does cross an indifference surface and let t * ≥ 0 be first time when such a crossing occurs. For t < t * , the flow is classical and we have x(t) = z(t) for t ≤ t * .
By (29) we see that for δ > 0 sufficiently small, x(t) is not in any indifference surface for t ∈ [t * − δ, t * + δ]\{t * }. Suppose that at time t = t * + δ we have x(t) =
x =ẑ = z(t). Let (x(τ )) τ ≥0 and (z(τ )) τ ≥0 be solutions to the time-reversed FP flow withx(0) =x andz(0) =ẑ.
Sincex =ẑ, and since the time-reversed flow is classical for 0 ≤ τ < δ (in particular, of the formẋ = a + x for some constant a), we getx(δ) =z(δ). But this is impossible because the paths (x(t)) t≥0 and (z(t)) t≥0 are absolutely continuous and we already established thatx(δ) = x(t * ) = z(t * ) =z(δ). As a matter of notation, we say that λ is a signed measure on R κ if there exists a Radon measure µ on R κ and a µ-measurable function σ :
for all compact sets K ⊂ R κ . When convenient, we write σµ to denote the signed measure λ in (30).
Letting elements x ∈ X be written componentwise as (x s ) κ s=1 , we recall [9] that a function u ∈ L 1 (Ω) (with Ω ⊆ R κ , Ω open) is a function of bounded variation (i.e., a BV function) if there exist finite signed Radon measures D s u such that the integration by parts formula
The measure D s u is called the weak, or distributional, partial derivative of u with respect to x s . We let Du := (D s u) s=1,...,κ .
The measure Du can be uniquely decomposed into three parts [1] (32) Du = ∇uL κ + Cu + Ju.
Here Ju is supported on a set J u with Hausdorff dimension κ − 1, and Cu is singular with respect to L κ and satisfies Cu(E) = 0 for all sets E with finite H κ−1 measure. The L 1 function ∇u is analogous to a classical derivative, and in particular if u is differentiable on an open set V then Du = ∇uL κ on that set, with ∇u matching the classical derivative. Furthermore, if u jumps across a smooth (κ − 1)-dimensional hypersurface, then for x on the hypersurface we have
where u + is the value of u on one side of the surface, u − is the value on the other, and ν is the normal vector pointing from u − to u + [1] . A vector-valued function f ∈ L 1 (Ω : R κ ) is a function of bounded variation if each of its components is also of bounded variation. Letting f be written componentwise as f = (f s ) κ s=1 , we write Df := (D j f s ) j,s=i,...,κ . Next we define the divergence of a function f ∈ L 1 (Ω : R κ ), denoted by D · f , as the measure
Given a constant c ∈ R, we say that D · f = c if D · f = dD·f dL κ L κ , and dD·f dL κ = c, where dD·f dL κ denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative. The following lemma characterizes the divergence of the FP vector field. As a matter of notation, if a function f : X → X satisfies f (x) ∈ FP(x) for all x ∈ X then we say f ∈ FP. The proof of this lemma follows from the fact that FP is piecewise linear, and any jumps in FP are tangential to indifference surfaces.
Proof. Suppose f ∈ FP, and let f be written componentwise as Since f k i is piecewise linear and only jumps on the set Ki =1, =k I i,k, which has finite κ−1 measure, f k i has no Cantor part; that is, Cf k i = (C j, f k i ) j=1,...,N, =1,...,γj = 0 (see (32)). Hence, the singular component of D · f , which we denote here as S, has no Cantor part and is given by
Suppose that x ∈ I i,k, for some (recall = k). Suppose ν is a vector that is normal to I i,k, at x. By the definition of I i,k, , if x ∈ I i,k, then for allx ∈ X such thatx −i = x −i we havex ∈ I i,k, . This implies that the (i, k)-th component of ν must be zero. Since
Since this is true for every pair (i, k) we see that S = 0, and hence D · f = −1 in the interior of X. An identical argument holds on the boundary of X, and hence, S = 0 and D · f = −1.
The following lemma shows that for sets E ⊆ X * with relatively smooth boundary, the surface integral of FP over the boundary of E is well defined.
Lemma 19. Let E be a subset of X * with piecewise smooth boundary. For any functions f, g ∈ FP we have
where ν E denotes the outer normal vector of E.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ X * is not on any indifference surface I i,k, . Then FP(x) maps to a singleton and f (x) = g(x).
Suppose x ∈ X * is on an indifference surface I i,k, . Let ν I denote a normal vector to I i,k, . Since x ∈ X * , the vector field FP can only jump tangentially to ν I . Using similar reasoning to the proof of Lemma 16, this implies that for any a, b ∈ FP(x) we have a · ν I (x) = b · ν I (x). Hence FP(x) · ν := a · ν, a ∈ FP(x) is well defined for such x.
In particular, note that if x ∈ X * is on some indifference surface I and ν I = ν E at x, then f (x) · ν E = FP(x) · ν I for any function f ∈ FP.
Let I be the union of all indifference surfaces. Since ∂E is piecewise continuous and the indifference surfaces are smooth, the set S := {x ∈ X * : x ∈ I ∩ ∂E, ν I (x) = ν ∂E (x)} has H κ−1 -measure zero, where ν I (x) and ν ∂E (x) denote the normal vectors to I and ∂E at x.
We have shown that f (∂E)\S = g (∂E)\S for all f, g ∈ FP, and H κ−1 (S) = 0, and hence,
for all f, g ∈ FP.
The following lemma shows that, within X * , the FP vector field compresses mass at a rate of −1. In particular, this implies that, within X * , FP cannot map a set of positive measure to a set of zero measure in finite time. 14 Lemma 20. Let E be a compact subset of X * with piecewise smooth boundary and finite perimeter. Then
Proof. We first note that by Lemma 18 for every f ∈ FP we have E dD · f = −L κ (E).
Let (f n ) n≥1 , f n : X * → X * be a sequence of uniformly bounded C 1 functions such that f n → f a.e. for some function f : X * → X * satisfying f (x) ∈ FP(x) for all x ∈ X * . (Such a sequence can be explicitly constructed by smoothing the FP vector field, e.g., [10] .)
Let 
where the third line follows from the Gauss-Green theorem [9] , the fourth line follows from the dominated convergence theorem (by assumption, E has finite perimeter and a piecewise smooth boundary, and f is bounded), and the fifth line follows from Lemma 19.
We now prove Proposition 15.
Proof. We begin by noting that, by Lemma 34 in the appendix, cl Q, has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2.
Let > 0. By the definition of the Hausdorff measure ( [9] , Chapter 2), there exists a countable collection of balls (B j ) j≥1 , each with diameter less than , such
2 )+1 , and where Γ in this context denotes the standard Γ function. Since ∂Z is closed, cl Q ∪ ∂Z is closed, and hence there exists a finite subcover (B j ) N j=1 such that cl Q ∪ ∂Z ⊂ Letting R denote the flux through ∂B into E (T − t) and again letting ν denote the outer normal to ∂E (T − t), for t > 0 we have
where the third line follows by Lemma 20. Noting that FP ∞ < ∞, the flux through ∂B is bounded by
By (36) we have H κ−1 (∂B ) → 0 as → 0, and henceR → 0 as → 0.
Using the integral form of Gronwall's inequality, (37) and (38) give V (t) ≤ tR e t , 0 < t ≤ T . In particular, this means that
where the right hand side goes to zero as → 0. Sending → 0, we see that the set
Since paths may only enter Z through the boundary ∂Z, this means that the set of points in X from which Z can be reached within time T is contained in W (T ) ∪ Z. Furthermore, the set of points from which Q ∪ Z can be reached within time T is contained in W (T ) ∪ Z ∪ Q, which is a L κ -measure zero set. Since this is true for every T > 0, we get the desired result.
Remark 21. We note that the proof given above implies that Q ∪ Z can only be reached in finite time from a L κ -measure zero subset of X * . Since X * := X\(Q ∪ Z), this, combined with Lemma 17, implies that for almost every initial condition x 0 ∈ X * , there exists a unique FP process x with x(0) = x 0 . Since L κ (X\X * ) = 0, this implies that for almost every x 0 ∈ X, there exists a unique FP process x with x(0) = x 0 .
Infinite-Time
Convergence. The following proposition shows that it is not possible to converge to Λ(x * ) in infinite time.
Proposition 22. Let Γ be a non-degenerate potential game and let x * be a mixedstrategy equilibrium. Suppose (x(t)) t≥0 is a FP process and x(t) → x * . Then x(t) converges to Λ(x * ) in finite time.
Proof. From the definitions of Λ(x * ) and P we see that
If we integrate (13) , use the fact P(x(t)) → P(x * ), and set e(t) := d(P(x(t)), P(x * )), then we find that (41)Ũ (P(x * )) −Ũ (P(x(t))) ≥ c 2 ∞ t e(s)ds.
Using ( Let t be fixed. Recursively applying the above inequality we find that
Thus if P(x(t)) converges to P(x * ), it must reach it for the first time in finite time.
By construction P(x) = P(x * ) if and only if x ∈ Λ(x * ). Hence, if x(t) converges to Λ(x * ) it must reach it for the first time in finite time.
By (13) we have d dtŨ (P(x(t))) ≥ 0 in a neighborhood of P(x * ). Since Γ is nondegenerate, the Hessian ofŨ is invertible at P(x * ), and for allx ∈X in a punctured ball around P(x * ) we haveŨ (x) =Ũ (P(x * )). Thus, if x(t) → x * and P(x(T )) = P(x * ) (i.e., x(T ) ∈ Λ(x * )) for some T ≥ 0, then we must have P(x(t)) = P(x * ) (i.e., x(t) ∈ Λ(x * )) for all t ≥ T . Contrariwise, we would haveŨ (P(x * )) =Ũ (P(x(T ))) < lim s→∞Ũ (P(x(s))) =Ũ (P(x * )), which is a contradiction.
Appendix.
Lemma 23. Suppose Γ is a degenerate game. At any mixed equilibrium there are at least two players using mixed strategies.
Proof. Suppose that x * is an equilibrium in which only one player uses a mixed strategy-say, player 1. Let C i = carr i (x * ) and γ i = |C i |. Then the mixed strategy Hessian is given by
..,γi = 0, where the equality to zero follows since U is linear in x 1 . 
Proof. (i) Differentiating (5) we find that
(ii) Follows readily from (5) .
Proof. The result follows readily from (43).
Lemma 26. Suppose x * is an equilibrium and y k i ∈ carr(x * ), k ≥ 2. Then
Proof. Since U is multilinear, y k i must be a pure-strategy best response to x * −i . The result then follows from Lemma 24. Proof. Differentiating (10) we see that
By the definition of g we have F (x p , g(x p ), u) = 0 for all x p in a neighborhood of x * p . Hence,
By (7) and (8) we see that D xm F (x p , x m , u) = H(x). Since the equilibrium x * is assumed to be non-degenerate, H(x * ) is invertible and the above implies that
Using (8) and the multilinearity of U , one may readily verify that D xp F (x * p , x * m , u) is entrywise finite. Since g is continuously differentiable, it follows that each entry of
is uniformly bounded for x = (x p , x m ) in a neighborhood of x * . Proof. Suppose the claim is false. Then for any > 0 there exists a sequence (x k ) k≥1 ⊂ B(x * , ) such that ∇V (x k ) < 1 k d(x k , x * ). Let (x k ) k≥1 be such a sequence that furthermore satisfies lim k→∞ d(x k , x * ) = 0. Let y k ∈ R n , t k ∈ R be such that x k = x * + t k y k , y k = 1. Since (y k ) k≥1 is a sequence on the unit sphere in R n it has a convergent subsequence; say, y kj → y as j → ∞. Let f : R → R be given by f (t) := V (x * + ty).
Using the continuity of ∇V we see that for any c > 0 we have |f (t)| < ct for all t sufficiently small. Since x * is a critical point of V we have f (0) = 0. Hence
Letting c → 0 we see that f (0) = 0. But this means 0 = f (0) = y T H(x * )y, implying the Hessian is singular, which is a contradiction.
The following lemma characterizes the level sets of polynomial functions. Before presenting the lemma we require the following definition. Lemma 30. Let p(x) : R n → R, n ≥ 1 be a polynomial that is not identically zero. Then L n (Z(p)) = 0.
Proof. We will prove the result using an inductive argument. Suppose first that n = 1 so that p : R → R. Let k denote the degree of p. Since p is not identically zero, the fundamental theorem of algebra implies that p has at most k zeros. Hence L 1 (Z(p)) = 0. Now, suppose that n ≥ 2 and for any polynomialp : R n−1 → R there holds L n−1 (Z(p)) = 0. We may write
where k is the degree of p in the variable x n , x = (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ), the functions p j , j = 0, . . . , k are polynomials in n − 1 variables, and where at least one p j is not identically zero.
If (x, x n ) is such that p(x, x n ) = 0 then there are two possibilities: Either (i) p 0 (x) = . . . = p k (x) = 0, or (ii) x n is the root of the one-variable polynomial p x (t) := k j=1 p j (x)t j .
Let A and B be the subsets of R n where (i) and (ii) hold respectively, so that Z(p) = A ∪ B. For any x n ∈ R we have (x, x n ) ∈ A ⇐⇒ x ∈ Z(p j ), ∀j = 1, . . . , k. By the induction hypothesis, we have Z(p j ) = 0 for at least one j, and hence R n−1 χ A (x, x n ) dx = 0 for any x n ∈ R, where we include the argument in the characteristic function χ A , in order to emphasize the dependence on both x and x n . This implies that x n → R n−1 χ (x,xn)∈A dx is a measurable function (it's identically zero) and
By the fundamental theorem of algebra, for any x ∈ R n−1 there are at most k values t ∈ R such that (x, t) ∈ B, and hence R χ B (x, x n ) dx n = 0. As before, this implies that x → R χ B (x, x n ) dx n is a measurable function and
Since Z(p) = B ∪ A, this proves the desired result.
Remark 31. Note that if p ≡ 0, then Z(p) = R n . Thus, in general, if p : R n → R is a polynomial, then Lemma 30 implies that either Z(p) = R n or L n (Z(p)) = 0.
Lemma 32. Suppose Γ is a non-degenerate potential game. Then each indifference surface I i,k, , as defined in (26), is a union of smooth surfaces with Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 1.
Proof. Throughout the proof, when we refer to the dimension of a set we mean the Hausdorff dimension. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, k, ∈ {1, . . . , K i }, k = and let I := I i,k, , where I i,k, is as defined in (26) . Note that I is the zero-level set of the polynomial p(x) := U (y k i , x −i ) − U (y i , x −i ). By Lemma 30 and Remark 31 we see that either L κ (I) = 0, or I = X. Being the level set of a polynomial, if L κ (I) = 0, then I is the union of smooth surfaces with dimension at most κ − 1.
Suppose that I has dimension greater than κ − 1. Then by the above, we see that I = X. Since Γ is a finite normal-form game, there exists at least one equilibrium x * ∈ X. Letting x * be written componentwise as x * = ([x * ] m j ) j=1,...,N, m=1,...,Ki−1 we see that if [x * ] k i > 0, then x * ∈ I = X implies that x * is a second-order degenerate equilibrium. Otherwise, if [x * ] k i = 0, then x * ∈ I = X implies that x * is a first-order degenerate equilibrium. In either case we see that x * is a degenerate equilibrium, and hence Γ is a degenerate game, which is a contradiction.
Since I was an arbitrary indifference surface, we see that if Γ is a non-degenerate game, then every indifference surface has dimension at most κ − 1.
Lemma 33. Let B be as defined in the proof of Proposition 15. Then,
Proof. Following standard notation (see [9] , Chapter 2), for 0 ≤ s < ∞, 0 < δ ≤ ∞, and A ⊂ R κ , let Lemma 34. Let Q be defined as in Section 5.1. Then cl Q has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2.
Proof. Let A be the subset of X where two or more decision surfaces intersect. Let N ⊂ A be the subset of X where two or more decision surfaces intersect and their normal vectors coincide. Define the relative interior of N with respect to A as Since each indifference surface has Hausdorff dimension κ − 1, N has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 1. In particular, N is the union of a finite number of smooth κ − 1 dimensional surfaces and a component with Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2. This implies that the relative boundary of N has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2.
LetQ be as defined in Section 5.1. Note that the closure ofQ satisfies clQ ⊆ Q ∪ ∂N . Since the setsQ and ∂N have Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2, the set clQ also has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2.
Let Λ(x * ) be as defined in Section 5. If Λ(x * ) = {x * }, then Λ(x * ) is closed and has Hausdorff dimension 0. Otherwise, Λ(x * ) is defined as the graph of g. In Section 4.1 it was shown that Graph(g) has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2. Since g is a smooth function, the closure of Graph(g) has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2.
Recall that Q is defined as Q =Q ∪ Λ(x * ) and hence cl Q = clQ ∪ cl Λ(x * ). Since clQ and cl Λ(x * ) each have Hausdorff dimension at most κ−2, cl Q also has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2.
Lemma 35. Let Z be as defined (28) . Then for any x ∈ Z there holds ν · y = 0 for any vector ν normal to Z at x, and any y ∈ F P (x)
Proof. Suppose x ∈ X and x is in some indifference surface I i,k, . Suppose ν is a vector that is normal to I i,k, at x. By the definition of I i,k, , if x ∈ I i,k, then for allx ∈ X such thatx −i = x −i we havex ∈ I i,k, . This implies that the (i,k)-th component of ν must be zero for everyk = 1, . . . , K i − 1.
For x ∈ X, let N (x) := {(i, k) : i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, k ∈ {1, . . . , K i − 1}, x ∈ I i,k, for some = 1, . . . , K i − 1, = k}. Letting FP k i be the (i, k)-th component map of FP, note that by the definition of an indifference surface, FP k i (x) is single valued for every pair (i, k) / ∈ N (x). Suppose x ∈ X\Q is in at least one decision surface I and let ν be a vector that is normal to I at x. Note that x / ∈ Q implies that if x is contained in any other decision surfaceÎ = I, then ν is also normal toÎ at x. Letting ν be written componentwise as ν = (ν k i ) i=1,...N, k=1,...,Ki−1 , the above discussion implies that ν k i = 0 for every pair (i, k) ∈ N (x).
Now suppose x ∈ Z. By the definition of Z we have x / ∈ Q and x is in at least one decision surface I. Let ν be a vector that is normal to I at x. By the definition of Z, there exists some y ∈ FP(x) such that y · ν = 0. Breaking this down in terms of components in N (x) we have 0 = y · ν = (i,k)∈N (x) y k i ν k i +
The first sum is zero since ν k i = 0 for all (i, k) ∈ N (x). Consequently, the second sum must also be zero. But we have shown above that F k i (x) is single valued for any (i, k) / ∈ N (x). Hence, for anyỹ ∈ FP(x) we haveỹ k i = y k i for all (i, k) / ∈ N (x), and in particular, ( Sinceỹ ∈ FP(x) was arbitrary, this proves the desired result.
